Twentieth-century wars in history teaching and public memory of present-day Croatia by Koren, Snježana
Studi sulla formazione, 2-2015, pag. 11-32   DOI: 10.13128/Studi_Formaz-18013
 ISSN 2036-6981 (online)
© Firenze University Press
Twentieth-century wars in history teaching and 
public memory of present-day Croatia*
Snježana Koren
On July 1, 2013, when Croatia celebrated its accession to the European 
Union, it was hard to imagine that only a few months later some leading Cro-
atian politicians would once again question the right to freedom of speech 
and freedom of expression. Let me illustrate this claim with a statement made 
by Tomislav Karamarko, the leader of the Croatian Democratic Union, one of 
the two biggest and most influential political parties in Croatia:
Everybody can think what he or she wants, but only in his or her own room, 
courtyard or house – certainly not in the public arena. Everyone will have 
to respect values that are [embedded] in the very foundations of the Croa-
tian state – these are the Homeland War [the 1991–1995 war in Croatia, au-
thor’s comment]1, our defenders2, our dead, the political doctrine of Dr. Franjo 
Tuđman and the great deeds of Gojko Šušak3. 
Ironically, this statement was made on May 3, 2014, World Press Freedom 
Day (!). A day later, faced with criticism over his statement as an attack on 
freedom of speech, Karamarko (who graduated with a university degree in 
history in the 1980s) explained what he actually meant:
*  This work has been fully supported by Croatian Science Foundation under the project 
“Making of the Socialist Man. Croatian Society and the Ideology of Yugoslav Socialism” 
(1718).
1 The term “Homeland War” appeared during the 1990s, first in politics and journalism. 
Today it is widely accepted in Croatia, not only in political documents, public discourse or 
education, but also in academics. 
2  “Croatian defenders” – a term which is officially used in Croatia to designate soldiers in the 
Croatian Army during the 1991–1995 war. 
3 See: S. n., “Ne može se pomiriti s tim da Hrvatska bude ‘pokvareni zub EU’ [He cannot 
accept that Croatia is a ‘bad tooth of the EU’],” Dnevnik Nove Tv, 3. 5. 2014, http://dnevnik.
hr/vijesti/hrvatska/karamarko-hdz-je-najsnaznija-infrastruktura-za-promjene-u-hr-
vatskoj---334314.html (accessed February 22, 2015). Franjo Tuđman was the first president of 
the independent Republic of Croatia, from 1990 to 1999. Gojko Šušak was defense minister 
from 1991 to 1998; he is considered one of the key figures in the successful war effort in Croa-
tia, but also as one of the advocates of rigid nationalism and one of the architects of Croatia’s 




I always emphasize that the modern Croatian state was created on the founda-
tions of the Homeland War and the political doctrine of Dr. Tuđman […] 
Enough with insulting the Homeland War, enough with underestimating, 
relativization and ideological fog […] If you do not agree with the Croatian 
state, if you think that we should forget all crimes committed against Croats, 
attempts to destroy the Croatian state and seize its territory – okay [...] think 
what you want, but not in public […] All of you who want to forget – who want 
to equate the victim with the aggressor – you can do that in your own home, 
but in the public arena, in textbooks [highlighted by S.K.], in newspapers, ple-
ase do not poison us with that4.
So, according to some high-ranking Croatian politicians, no one should 
publicly express interpretations other than the official interpretations of cer-
tain key events from Croatian contemporary history. Moreover, these diverse 
opinions especially should not be expressed in the media or in school (history) 
textbooks. But these ideas should not come as a surprise to anyone in Croatia. 
Such an oppressive culture of thinking about the purpose of school history, 
a model which allows only “proper” interpretations of past events, has been 
more the rule than the exception in the last hundred years. But let us put aside 
for a moment the fact that such official interpretations are prone to change 
together with political changes, and that this has already happened more than 
once over the past decades. One would expect, however, that in a country dev-
astated by an economic crisis, whose economy in 2014 contracted for the sixth 
year in a row and is one of the worst in the EU, economy – not history – would 
be in the focus of the current political debate. Yet this is not the case: history 
continues to be (mis-)used as a means of fighting political battles, and as one 
of the key focuses of political arguments.
Let me briefly describe the contemporary Croatian political landscape. 
Croatia was part of Yugoslavia until its violent breakup in the early 1990s. 
Following the collapse of the ruling League of Yugoslav Communists, the first 
multi-party elections were held in the spring of 1990. After the war broke out 
in 1991, Croatia declared its independence and gained diplomatic recognition 
from the European Economic Community and the United States in 1992. The 
impact of the war on the further development of the country was serious. It is 
estimated that the war claimed some 22,000 lives.5 It caused a huge number 
4  Quoted in: Dražen Ciglenečki, “Karamarko: Ja sam to iskarikirao zato što je to bio skup 
branitelja i svi su bili emotivni, [Karamarko: I was exaggerating because it was a gathering of 
veterans and everyone was emotional]” Novi list, 5. 5. 2014., http://www.novilist.hr/Vijesti/
Hrvatska/Karamarko-Ja-sam-to-iskarikirao-zato-sto-je-to-bio-skup-branitelja-i-svi-su-
bili-emotivni (accessed February 22, 2015).
5  There is no individualized list of victims of the 1991–1995 war in Croatia, but only various 
estimates. According to the most detailed account, among the 22,000 casualties of the war, 
36.7% were Croatian soldiers, 29% were Croatian civilians, 5.5% were missing Croatian 
soldiers and civilians, and 28% were killed and missing Serbian soldiers and civilians. Dražen 
Živić, “Demografski gubitci Hrvatske vojske tijekom Domovinskog rata [Demographic losses 
of the Croatian Army during the Homeland War],” Diacovensia, Vol.12 No.1 (June 2005): 
119–140. According to another report, which takes into account only Croatian casualties, 
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of refugees to flee from areas that during the war were under the control of 
local Serbs and the Yugoslav Army (about one-third of Croatia’s territory), 
not to mention extensive material damage. The state of war also served as a 
pretext for numerous violations of human rights and media freedoms, as well 
as increasing authoritarian rule. The war drew public attention away from the 
country’s problematic economic transition (privatization), whose effects on 
the Croatian economy were in many aspects devastating. The war ended in 
the summer of 1995, after the Croatian Army, in a military operation code-
named Storm, restored control over most of Croatian territory. These events 
also resulted in a mass exodus of the Serb population from the territories af-
fected by Operation Storm. Podunavlje (Danube basin region), the only part 
of the country that remained under Serbian control after 1995, was peace-
fully reintegrated in 1998. After the war, the share of ethnic Serbs in the total 
population of Croatia was reduced from the prewar figure of 12.2 percent to 
4.4 percent (according to the 2011 census). 
Under its 1990 constitution, Croatia operated under a semi-presidential 
system. When constitutional changes were made in 2000, the country switched 
to a parliamentary system. There are two major political parties – the Croa-
tian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) – as 
well as a number of smaller national and regional parties. HDZ was founded 
in 1989 by Franjo Tuđman, the Croatian president from 1990 to 1999. It has 
been in power for most of the period since 1990 (1990–2000 and 2003–2011). 
HDZ is a conservative right-wing party; its political attitudes vary from cen-
ter-right to radical-right and are strongly colored by the ideology of ethnic na-
tionalism. At the moment, HDZ is the strongest opposition party in Croatia. 
It lost power in the 2011 elections after several major corruption and political 
scandals, causing the party to win its smallest number of votes since its foun-
dation. The other major political party, SDP, evolved from the former League 
of Communists of Croatia. It is the largest party of the Croatian centre-left, 
and its political ideas are in many aspects closer to those of (left) liberal par-
ties than of social democratic parties. SDP led a coalition government from 
2000–2003, after HDZ lost power for the first time after 1990. It is currently in 
power (since the end of 2011) as the senior partner in the governing coalition. 
The present Croatian government has so far been rather unsuccessful in 
managing the deep economic and social problems of the country, caused by 
the prolonged economic crisis, widespread unemployment, and the unwilling-
ness of governments to conduct necessary but often painful reforms. For many 
months, polls have shown that HDZ is steadily gaining in popularity, while the 
Social Democrats are losing support. After its weak performance in the 2011 
48.7% were military deaths and 51.3% civilian deaths. Andrija Hebrang, Zločini nad civilima 
u srpsko-crnogorskoj agresiji na Republiku Hrvatsku [Crimes against civilians in the Serbian-




parliamentary elections, the HDZ leadership was replaced. The new leadership, 
with Karamarko as the party’s new president, began a process of party consoli-
dation. Their strategy also includes a return to the nationalist rhetoric of the 
1990s; some political analysts see this strategy as a tailwind for a trend of na-
tionalism that began to reappear after the completion of the EU accession pro-
cess6. This was evident in the last presidential elections (end of 2014 / beginning 
of 2015), in which the candidate of the opposition (HDZ) narrowly won over the 
candidate supported by SDP and some other left-wing parties, as well as in the 
recently held parliamentary elections (November 8, 2015)7. The history of the 
twentieth century regularly serves as fuel to feed and inflame these sentiments. 
History teaching and history textbooks have already been under the spe-
cial scrutiny of leading HDZ politicians for several months now. There are 
quite a few examples. On August 23, 2014 (Day of Remembrance for the vic-
tims of all totalitarian and authoritarian regimes), Karamarko delivered a 
speech in which he outlined the new politics of history if HDZ wins the next 
general elections:
When HDZ comes to power, and this is going to happen after the next par-
liamentary elections, we will first implement lustration8 – as far as this is 
possible today, but we will do it. Then, we will banish that criminal [Josip 
Broz Tito, author’s comment] from all the streets and squares in Croatia. And 
most importantly, we will finally fix Croatian schools. Not like today, when 
some quasi-historians write history the way it suits them. We need to unify 
school standards. Ultimately, we have to write realistically about the past. We 
shouldn’t continue to learn quasi-communist history in which one of the ten 
greatest world criminals, Broz Tito, is portrayed as a some sort of bon vivant, 
a hedonist, and therefore, quite a normal person9.
6  See: Dejan Jović, “First ‘return to Europe’, then to the 1990s,” Balkans in Europe Policy 
Blog, Centre for Southeast European Studies, http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/
biepag/node/144 (accessed February 22, 2015).
7  The first Croatian parliamentary elections after joining the EU were held on 8 November 
2015. The coalition led by the HDZ won 59 seats, including all three seats allocated to Croatian 
citizens living abroad. The ruling alliance, led by the Social Democrats, won 56 seats, but it is 
expected that representatives from some minor parties, as well as minority representatives, 
will side with the Social Democrats. Both coalitions, however, are well short of the 76 seats 
needed for a parliamentary majority. A new, third group – an alliance of independent 
candidates known as Most (Bridge) – won 19 seats, thus becoming the third most influential 
political force in the country. Croatia faces difficult coalition negotiations to form a stable 
government, and repeating the elections in January 2016 is not the least likely option.
8 Lustration of the former members of the Communist Party is often emphasized in the 
speeches of HDZ officials, although today, former Communist Party members can be found 
in both major political parties. It is even likely that they are more numerous in HDZ than 
in SDP. However, because there are no clear criteria for lustration (especially since it is now 
a quarter of a century after the collapse of communism), there are reasonable fears that 
lustration could serve the political purpose of eliminating political opponents and imposing 
control over the media, the judicial system, secret services, universities, etc. See: Jović, “First 
‘return to Europe’, then to the 1990s.”
9  See: S. n., “Karamarko, Čičak, Banac: Provest ćemo lustraciju, a zločinca Broza maknuti s 
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Following this speech, some other members of the HDZ Committee on 
Education announced that the topic of communist crimes should be given 
special attention in future history curricula and textbooks (disregarding the 
fact that it has been part of history teaching for the past 25 years). They men-
tioned the 1991–1995 war in the same context – according to them, the Home-
land War is not dealt with objectively and not taught thoroughly enough10. 
Then, at the commemoration of the fifteenth anniversary of the death of Fran-
jo Tuđman (December 10, 2014), Karamarko announced the unification of 
history textbook narratives about Tuđman, as well as the introduction of the 
concept of tuđmanizam (‘Tuđmanism’, described as the political doctrine of 
Franjo Tuđman) into the Croatian Constitution:
They are trying to take our children away from us. What kind of school 
textbooks do we have? When we come to power, we will certainly change that. 
Textbooks must be unified, and in these textbooks we will verify the role and 
the work of Dr. Tuđman in the right manner. And not only in the textbooks. 
We will introduce the concept of tuđmanizam into the Constitution […]11. 
On February 24, 2015, in his speech at the celebration of the 25th anni-
versary of the first general assembly of HDZ, Karamarko emphasized sev-
eral points: he paid a special tribute to Franjo Tuđman and his legacy. He 
announced the construction of a monument in Tuđman’s honor “at a distin-
guished place” in the capital, the reintroduction of sponsorship by the Croa-
tian Parliament over the commemoration in Bleiburg field (see the explana-
tion later on in the text), as well as the adoption of a declaration which would 
“conclude the tragic balance of the Second World War”12. In that speech, he 
raised the issue of history teaching once again:
ulica i trgova, [Karamarko, Čičak, Banac: We will conduct lustration and remove the name of 
that criminal Broz from streets and squares]” Maxportal, 24. 8. 2014., http://www.maxportal.
hr/karamarko-cicak-banac-provest-cemo-lustraciju-a-zlocinca-broza-maknuti-s-ulica-i-
trgova/ (accessed February 22, 2015).
10  Maja Šurina, „HDZ bi mijenjao knjige: Tito je out, a Domovinski rat je in [HDZ 
would change textbooks: Tito is out, and the Homeland War is in],” Tportal, 29. 8. 2014., 
http://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/348337/HDZ-bi-mijenjao-knjige-Tito-je-out-a-
Domovinski-rat-je-in.html (accessed February 22, 2015).
11  See: Dražen Ciglenečki, “Karamarko: Pojam tuđmanizam uvest ćemo u Ustav RH 
[Karamarko: We will introduce the concept of Tuđmanism into the Croatian Constitution],” 
Novi list, 11. 12. 2014., http://www.novilist.hr/Vijesti/Hrvatska/Karamarko-Pojam-
tudmanizam-uvest-cemo-u-Ustav-RH (accessed February 22, 2015). Also: Speech 
by Tomislav Karamarko at the Academy on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of 
the death of Dr. Franjo Tudjman (10. 12. 2014.), https://www.youtube.com/channel/
UCc9lr9dLTC3jE1yzK1CSvLA (accessed February 22, 2015).
12  Speech of Tomislav Karamarko at the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the first general 
assembly of HDZ, February 24, 2015: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p9ly9RPXXSw 
(accessed February 28, 2015).
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It is unacceptable that national content, such as the Homeland War, are taught 
superficially, incorrectly, or at the end of the school year, when fatigue and 
the workload take their toll. We are aware that the public school system is a 
sensitive area and we do not want to conduct any experiments, but we need to 
examine some curricula and textbook standards that are now, unfortunately, 
more tailored to various particular interests, rather than to the interests of 
students and patriotic education13.
 
In one of his recent interviews, however, Karamarko stressed that “no one 
should be afraid of lustration” because there is no point in blacklisting from 
public offices those persons who were once affiliated with the Communist re-
gime, but who are now already too old. He called for a “fundamental change 
in the social climate” instead – in this process, education, culture, and history 
should have a prominent role. If he becomes prime minister, he said, he would 
“pay special attention to school programs” – they should include “the whole 
truth, whether some would like it or not”14.
So, ultimately, it is all about the teaching of two twentieth-century wars, as 
well as the results and consequences of these wars. World War II has been in 
focus of debates about history and history teaching in the past quarter-centu-
ry; debates about the 1991–1995 war intensified after 2000. Why are these two 
wars so fiercely debated in Croatia, and what are the consequences of these 
debates for the history teaching?
The “National Liberation Struggle” in the politics of history of socialist Yugo-
slavia and post-1990 Croatia
The 1941–1945 war in Yugoslavia was not only a war of liberation against 
the Axis occupying forces (German, Italian, Bulgarian, Hungarian) and their 
locally established puppet regimes. It was also a terrible civil war between the 
Partisan resistance movement led by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and 
various political and military groups which collaborated with the Axis, most 
notably the Chetniks and the Ustashe.15 During the war, Croats split their 
13  Ibid.
14  “Moj antikomunistički manifest [My anti-Communist manifesto],” an interview with 
Tomislav Karamarko in Globus, no. 1276, 22. 5. 2015. See also: Ivanka Toma, “Karamarkov 
antikomunistički manifest u praksi [Karamarko’s anti-Communist manifesto in practice],” 
Jutarnji list, 30. 5. 2015, http://www.jutarnji.hr/karamarkov-antikomunisticki-manifest-u-
praksi/1357754/ (accessed June 2, 2015). 
15  The main goals of the Partisans and their communist leadership were to fight the 
occupying forces and collaborators and to restore Yugoslavia as a federal state with a 
Soviet-style government. The Chetniks of Draža Mihailović were originally established as a 
resistance movement with a monarchist and nationalist agenda. They wanted the restoration 
of a monarchist Yugoslavia under Serbian domination. The Chetniks soon came into 
conflict with the Partisans and adopted a policy of collaboration with regard to the Axis. 
The Ustashe were established at the beginning of the 1930s as a revolutionary and terrorist 
organization, emphasizing as their goal the creation of an independent Croatia. The ideology 
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allegiance between the Partisan Movement, which wanted to restore Yugo-
slavia as a federal state, and the Independent State of Croatia, a fascist puppet 
state established by the Axis and ruled by the Ustashe. Partisans carried out 
the main fighting against the Axis and its collaborators and, at the Tehran 
conference (November 1943), they got support from the major Allied powers. 
They won the war, and Yugoslavia was restored as a federal and multiethnic 
republic and, eventually, as a communist state. 
The human cost of the war was enormous, and it is estimated to have been 
around one million (out of approximately 16 million inhabitants in Yugosla-
via before the war); civilian victims made up more than half of that number. 
Axis occupying forces and collaborators carried out mass executions of ci-
vilians in retaliation for resistance activity and pursued ethnic cleansing in 
some territories. The majority of Yugoslavia’s Jewish population perished as a 
consequence of the persecutions of the German occupying forces and puppet 
regimes in Croatia and Serbia. The Ustashe regime also committed genocide 
against Serbs and Roma on the territory of the Independent State of Croatia 
(NDH) and murdered numerous antifascists. The Chetniks committed nu-
merous crimes against the Muslim and Croat populations on the territory of 
today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. Allied bombings, especially in 
the last two years of the war, took their toll of civilian victims as well. During 
and after the final stages of the war, Partisan troops and the Yugoslav aut-
horities carried out reprisals, including forced marches and mass executions 
of captured collaborators, deportations of ethnic Germans, atrocities against 
Italians, etc.16. 
In post-war Yugoslavia, the “National Liberation Struggle” (this is how the 
1941–45 war used to be called in Yugoslavia; hereafter: NOB) was a topic of 
particular significance. With its emphasis on the “common struggle of all Yu-
goslav nations led by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia against the occupy-
ing forces and the collaborators” (as the phrase goes), the NOB was meant to 
provide the basis of legitimacy for the Yugoslav Communist regime. Conse-
quently, it was a topic of special importance for history teaching: a significant 
number of class hours were assigned to this topic in curricula, students regu-
larly visited sites associated with the Partisan struggle, student competitions 
in knowledge of the NOB were held, etc. In textbooks, the topic was elabo-
rated in detail: it was a story of military offensives, Partisan victories, and the 
heroic deeds of Partisan fighters. It was also a rather monolithic narrative, 
in which each of the Yugoslav nations had their own heroes and villains: the 
of this movement was a blend of fascism and Croatian nationalism. In April 1941, they were 
appointed to rule the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), a fascist puppet state established 
by the Axis. See: Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation 
and Collaboration. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001). (Croatian translation: Jozo 
Tomasevich, Rat i revolucija u Jugoslaviji 1941 – 1945: okupacija i kolaboracija, Zagreb: EPH 
Liber, 2010).
16  Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945, p. 718–750. 
Dossier18
Snježana Koren
former were Partisan fighters recruited from all Yugoslav nations, and the 
latter were the occupying forces and collaborators (the Ustaše, the Chetniks, 
the Slovenian White Guard, etc.). The shared experience of fighting against 
fascism – which was expressed in the famous slogan “brotherhood and unity” 
– was also meant to provide a common supranational and unifying narra-
tive for all Yugoslav nations. However, different interpretations of war events 
among the political and intellectual elites of the six Yugoslav republics – about 
the role of each of the Yugoslav nations during the war and their merits in the 
creation of the second Yugoslavia – served in certain periods as an indicator 
of deeper inter-ethnic strife, especially in Croatian-Serbian relations. Occa-
sionally, these conflicting narratives found their reflection in the history text-
books of the Yugoslav republics (each republic produced its own textbooks).17 
But these were not the kinds of discussions that would allow the inclusion of 
memories of those who had fought on the other side in the civil war: neither 
the mass killings of war prisoners committed by Partisan forces in May 1945 
nor the retaliation and atrocities against the German and Italian populations 
were ever mentioned in history lessons.
In the period of political changes that occurred during and after the col-
lapse of Yugoslavia, it was precisely the narrative on World War II that un-
derwent extensive and often disputed modifications in all of the former Yu-
goslav republics. In Croatia, these changes were very much determined by the 
political needs of the HDZ leadership. Tuđman had fought during the war as 
a member of the Yugoslav Partisans. He had been a general in the Yugoslav 
Army and a member of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. After his military 
career, he worked as a historian and actively participated in shaping the narra-
tive about the NOB as an author and a director of the Institute for the History 
of the Workers’ Movement of Croatia in Zagreb (1961–67). Later, he came into 
conflict with the regime, which ended his career and made him a dissident. 
When Tuđman became the Croatian president, he promoted the idea of 
“national reconciliation” among the former war adversaries (the Partisans 
and the Ustaše) and their descendants, based on the synthesis of state-build-
ing elements from the different political and ideological options originating 
from World War II. Reconciliation was seen as the basic precondition for the 
creation of an independent Croatian state in the 1990s. But it was also very 
much determined by the need of the HDZ leadership to reconcile conflicting 
narratives within the party. Some of Tuđman’s closest associates and “found-
ing fathers” of HDZ were also former communists, former members of the 
Yugoslav army, police, and secret services. On the other hand, Tuđman re-
ceived strong support from émigré circles, very much influenced by those who 
17  Snježana Koren, Politika povijesti u Jugoslaviji (1945–1960): Komunistička partija 
Jugoslavije, nastava povijesti, historiografija [Politics of history in Yugoslavia (1945–1960): 
the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, history teaching, historiography], (Zagreb: Srednja 
Europa, 2012), 309–375.
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fled Croatia at the very end of World War II either because they were strongly 
affiliated with the NDH or because they were opponents of the Yugoslav Com-
munist regime. The idea of reconciliation promoted the ethnic concept of a 
nation: only Croats in Croatia and abroad were invited to participate in it, 
while other Croatian citizens, especially Serbs, were excluded. In this con-
cept, democracy was of secondary importance and the homogenization of the 
Croatian nation was given priority.
The politics of history promoted by the HDZ leadership strongly influenced 
the public use of history in the 1990s. Thousands of monuments erected in the 
period of socialist Yugoslavia to honor the Partisan struggle were destroyed or 
damaged. In many towns and places, names that previously recalled Partisan 
fighters and brigades, or the achievements of socialism, were removed from 
public spaces. However, these practices have strongly varied from one region 
of Croatia to another; they remain the source of constant conflict between 
those who want these names or monuments (including those of Tito) to be re-
moved and those who would not support that decision. In history textbooks of 
the 1990s, the number of pages dedicated to Partisan warfare and victories in 
World War II was heavily reduced. These changes, however, were only partly 
motivated by the rigid manner in which this topic used to be taught in the 
previous period. In the new interpretative paradigm, the Partisan Movement 
in Croatia was not interpreted altogether negatively, but it was separated from 
the rest of the Yugoslav context and primarily placed in the context of creating 
the Croatian state within the Yugoslav federation. This shift was also reflected 
in terminology: the term “National Liberation Struggle” (NOB) was replaced 
by the term “Croatian Antifascist Movement.” 
At the other end of the spectrum, members of the Ustaše movement were, 
in a way, rehabilitated as fighters for an independent Croatia and against 
Serbian domination. In textbooks, the establishment of the NDH was pre-
sented as a positive historical fact. Ustaše atrocities against Serbs, Jews and 
Roma were marginalized and glossed over (especially those committed at the 
concentration camp Jasenovac18), and the story of the mass killings of war 
prisoners committed by Partisans at the end of the war was given a central 
place. Annual commemorations near the town of Bleiburg on the Austrian-
Slovenian border, where the armed forces of the NDH surrendered in May 
1945, were sponsored by the Croatian Parliament until three years ago. These 
commemorations, established in the 1950s by Croatian émigré circles, me-
morialize events at the very end of the war when Partisan forces committed 
18  Jasenovac concentration camp was the largest extermination camp established by the 
authorities of NDH and operated by the Ustaše. The majority of victims were ethnic Serbs, 
Jews, and Roma, as well as anti-fascist or dissident Croats. Since World War II, there has 
been much debate and controversy regarding the number of victims killed at the Jasenovac. 
Institutions such as the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, the 
Jasenovac Memorial Site, and the Museum of Genocide in Belgrade presently estimate that 
the Ustaše regime murdered between 80,000 and 100,000 people in Jasenovac. 
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mass liquidations of captured war adversaries, mostly soldiers of the NDH. 
The Bleiburg commemorations had always been controversial, however, be-
cause they regularly served not only to pay homage to the victims, but also as 
a memorial celebration of the NDH.
Debating the teaching of the “Homeland War”
Simultaneously with the debates about the teaching of the Second World 
War, the new history curricula and textbooks in the first half of the 1990s 
began to include the topic of the 1991–1995 war, which in Croatia is called the 
“Homeland War.” In fact, a 1992 history textbook already included descriptions 
of events in this conflict, which was still in progress. These narratives were very 
much attuned with the official memory, but they were also highly problematic 
because they used politicized and loaded language whose primary function 
was not to inform, but to sway the emotions of readers. But in the 1990s these 
narratives were not yet problematized nor subjected to public debate.
In the years since, these views of Croatia’s recent past have frequently 
been criticized both inside and outside of Croatia, especially in the period 
after 2000 when HDZ lost power for the first time. Because of its negative as-
pects – such as Croatia’s involvement in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
dubious privatization practices, authoritarian leadership in the second half 
of the 1990s, the treatment of minorities, etc. – Tuđman’s legacy has been 
called into question in the years after his death, through a process usually 
called de-Tuđmanisation. Part of this process was also the appointment of 
the Commission for the Evaluation of History Textbooks inherited from the 
1990s (2000–2001)19. Although its results were meager, its activities prompted 
a public debate about history teaching. As a result, history curricula and most 
textbooks that have been published since 2000 have abandoned the most con-
troversial parts of the 1990s narrative, especially its positive evaluation of the 
NDH. The paradigm of history teaching has also gradually started to change: 
in history curricula, textbooks, and everyday teaching practice, history has 
increasingly been presented not only as a body of carefully selected facts 
and value judgments, but also as a critical engagement with the past. But the 
framework that was set in the 1990s, especially the ethno-national ideology, 
still strongly permeates the curricula and textbook narratives. Furthermore, 
in some of the textbooks published after 2000, there are still underlying as-
sumptions that to a certain extent reflect other contested paradigms from the 
1990s about World War II20.
19 For the activities of this commission, see: Snježana Koren, Branislava Baranović, “What 
Kind of History Education Do We Have after Eighteen Years of Democracy in Croatia? 
Transition, Intervention, and History Education Politics (1990–2008)”, in ‘Transition’ and 
the Politics of History Education in Southeast Europe, ed. Augusta Dimou (Göttingen: V&R 
unipress, 2009): 105–112.
20  See: Snježana Koren, “Nastava povijesti između historije i pamćenja: Hrvatski udžbenici 
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After 2003, the intensity of debates about World War II was temporar-
ily diminished, and the 1991–1995 war came into the focus of discussions 
about the content of primary and secondary history education. There were 
two major debates over interpretations of the “Homeland War” in school his-
tory textbooks, one in 2005 and the another in 2007. These debates were also 
determined by the contemporary political context. In the years following the 
end of the conflict, the 1991–1995 war has acquired an important place in the 
official memory. It has been increasingly portrayed as one of the key events 
in Croatian history, the victory of the Croatian defenders over the Serbian 
aggressors, which ensured the very existence of today’s Croatia. For many, 
no longer was it the synthesis of different ideological state-building elements 
originating from World War II that provided the foundation for today’s Croa-
tia, but the “values and virtues of the Homeland War.” 
Secondly, in years after 2000, the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) issued indictments against a number of senior Cro-
atian Army commanders for war crimes, bringing to the surface some ques-
tions that have continuously burdened the memories of the war. Among them, 
the issue of war crimes committed by Serbs and Croats, as well as different 
evaluations of wartime events, have had the most influence on the textbook 
debates. Attempts to raise these questions have met strong resistance among 
those politicians and veterans of war associations who regard it as their duty 
to protect what they refer to as the “dignity of the Homeland War.” These 
divisions and conflicts in the society prompted the Croatian Parliament to 
issue several declarations attempting to provide an official interpretation of 
the war, the most important of which were the Declaration on the Homeland 
War (2000) and the Declaration on Operation Storm (2006)21. These develop-
ments also found their reflection in history teaching. There were two paral-
lel processes after 2000. Some textbooks began to offer narratives that went 
beyond the simplified descriptions of wartime events characteristic of the 
povijesti o 1945. godini [History teaching between history and memory: Croatian history 
textbooks on 1945],” in Kultura sjećanja: 1945. Povijesni lomovi i svladavanje prošlosti 
[Culture of remembrance: 1945. Historical turning points and mastering the past], eds. 
Sulejman Bosto and Tihomir Cipek (Zagreb: Disput, 2009): 239–263.
21  In the Declaration on the Homeland War it is emphasized that Croatia “led a just and 
legitimate, defensive and liberating war, and not a war of conquest and aggression against 
anyone.” In the Declaration on Operation Storm, this military operation is described as a 
“legitimate,” “victorious,” “allied,” “antiterrorist,” “decisive” and “unforgettable” battle. State 
officials and authorities are “obliged” (although without any sanctions), while scientific and 
educational institutions, the media, trade unions, etc. are “called on ” to protect the “basic 
values and the dignity of the Homeland War.” However, both declarations avoid mentioning 
the issue of Croatia’s role in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. See: Snježana Koren, 
“‘Korisna prošlost’? Ratovi devedesetih u deklaracijama Hrvatskog sabora [‘Useful past’? 
The 1990s wars in the declarations of the Croatian Parliament],” in Kultura sjećanja: 1991. 
Povijesni lomovi i svladavanje prošlosti [Culture of remembrance: 1991. Historical turning 
points and mastering the past], ed. Tihomir Cipek (Zagreb: Disput, 2011): 123–155. 
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1990s. Simultaneously, there were increasing demands by some members of 
war veteran associations and some politicians to expand the number of school 
lessons allocated to this topic (which, they maintained, should be taught in a 
“proper” manner). 
Finally, in 2003–2004 the Ministry of Education had to deal with the end of 
the moratorium on teaching recent history in Podunavlje (the Danube basin 
region). Podunavlje is the easternmost part of Croatia, one of the most ethni-
cally heterogeneous areas (among several ethnic groups, Croats are the largest 
and Serbs the second largest). The area was heavily affected by the war, mainly 
during the 1991 military campaign led by the Yugoslav Army and local Ser-
bian militias, which caused numerous deaths and extensive destruction. The 
most important battle was the battle of Vukovar, the biggest town in the area. 
Vukovar became a symbol of the war’s destruction and the suffering of Croats 
in Podunavlje. When Croatia regained control over most of its territory in the 
west of the country in the summer of 1995, Podunavlje remained under the 
control of the local Serbs. The region was placed under the UN Transitional 
Administration, and it was peacefully reintegrated with Croatia in 1998. The 
peace agreement ensured the educational rights of the Serbian minority in the 
region, but it also resulted in segregated education for Croatian and Serbian 
children. Part of the agreement was the decision to implement a five-year em-
bargo (“the moratorium”) on the teaching contemporary Croatian history in 
classes of Serbian pupils, starting with the school-year 1997–98 and ending in 
the school-year 2002–200322. 
The 2005 debate was prompted when the Ministry of Education decided, 
after the expiration of the moratorium, to create a supplement to the existing 
textbooks that covered contemporary history (entitled Supplement to Text-
books on Current Croatian History) that would be in temporary use until new 
textbooks were developed.23 The text was commissioned from a group of au-
22 More about this topic (in English): Eric Stover, Harvey Weinstein eds., My neighbor, my 
enemy: Justice and community in the aftermath of mass atrocity (Cambridge : Cambridge 
University Press, 2004); Branislava Baranović, Boris Jokić, Karin Doolan, “Teaching history 
in a post-war social context: The Case of Croatian Danube region”, Intercultural Education 
18 (2007): 455–471; Dinka Čorkalo Biruški, “Lesson learned from the Former Yugoslavia: 
The case of Croatia”, in Handbook of ethnic conflict: International perspecitves, eds. Dan 
Landis, Rosita D. Albert (New York: Springer, 2012): 327-248; Dinka Čorkalo Biruški, Dean 
Ajduković, “Parallel worlds of divided community: Time does not make much difference”, 
Peace psychology in the Balkans: Dealing with a violent past while building peace, eds. Olivera 
Simić, Zala Volčič, Catherine R. Philpot (New York : Springer, 2012): 177–198; Dario Spini, 
Guy Elcheroth, Dinka Čorkalo Biruški eds., War, community and social change: Collective 
experiences in the Former Jugoslavia (New York: Springer, 2014).
23 The debate on the supplement is well-documented. It resulted in two books. The first 
one – Jedna povijest, više historija: dodatak udžbenicima s kronikom objavljivanja [One 
past, many histories: the Supplement to Textbooks with a chronicle of publication] (Zagreb: 
Documenta, 2007) – offers the perspective of the authors of the supplement. This book 
contains the supplement, newspaper clips, various documents, and several essays written 
by the authors and some other participants in the debate. The other – Multiperspektivnost 
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thors who envisaged a handbook that would provide different perspectives 
on wartime events. The 2007 debate coincided with the publication of new 
history textbooks, some of which also tried to offer a more multiperspective 
approach to the teaching of the recent war. Both the supplement and some of 
the 2007 history textbooks came under attack from various war veterans’ as-
sociations, right-wing politicians, and journalists from the right-wing media, 
as well as some historians. The attempts to introduce different perspectives 
to the teaching of recent conflicts and to address crimes committed by both 
Serbs and Croats were condemned as education “without any value guide-
lines,” a “distortion of the historical truth about the Serbian aggression,” a 
“relativization of the Serbian responsibility for the war,” and an attempt “to 
equate the Croatian victims with the Serbian aggressor.” The Supplement was 
also criticized because of its “neutral terminology” and its avoidance of the 
term “the Homeland War.” Another issue in both of these debates was how 
textbook authors should deal with the parliamentary declarations on the 
1990s war – whether these declarations are obligatory interpretative guides 
for history textbook authors or not.
However, these two attempts to produce a different narrative about the 
war did not have the same ending. In the case of the supplement, the nega-
tive publicity, together with the charged atmosphere of war crime trials, and 
the commemoration of the tenth anniversary of Operation Storm, resulted 
in the Ministry’s decision to give up on the project, leaving the authors of the 
book on their own in the debates that took place months after the text was 
made public. This attempt proved to be premature, but it opened up ques-
tions on how to teach about the 1991–1995 war. Two years later, in a more 
favorable political context, the Ministry of Education eventually accepted all 
textbooks after some minor changes. But there were other consequences as 
well. The supplement debate prompted the Ministry of Education to make 
extensive changes to the unit on the 1991–1995 war in the new history cur-
riculum for compulsory education, which was under construction at the time 
(2005–2006). These modifications made that topic the most elaborated one in 
the curriculum, but at the same time it was cleansed of any events that could 
interfere with the official memory of the war.24 The debate over the 2007 his-
ili realitiviziranje: dodatak udžbenicima za najnoviju povijest i istina o Domovinskom ratu 
[Multiperspectivity or relativisation: the Supplement to Textbooks and the truth about the 
Homeland War] (Slavonski Brod: Hrvatski institut za povijest, Podružnica za povijest 
Slavonije, Srijema i Baranje, 2008) – offers the perspective of the critics. It contains several 
essays by historians who wrote negative reviews of the supplement, as well as their reviews. 
See also: Iavor Rangelov, Nationalism and the Rule of Law. Lessons from the Balkans and 
Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 158–159. Edith Marko-Stöckl, My 
Truth, Your Truth – Our Truth? The Role of Truth Commissions and History Teaching for 
Reconciliation. Specific report on the role of history for reconciliation in the frame of the FP& 
project “Human and Minority Rights in the Life Cycle of Ethnic Conflicts (MIRICO, 2008), 
14-17.
24 For example, students are expected to describe in detail the course of the war, to describe the 
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tory textbooks encouraged the ministry to start organizing (from 2008) an-
nual Seminars on the Homeland War for history teachers: in-service training 
of history teachers has proven to be another important strategy the ministry 
has at its disposal to promote an official version of history.
Recent debates
Among the strategies of the current government led by Social Demo-
crats, dealing (or “dealing”) with the past does not play such a prominent 
role. Although state officials have regularly attended commemorations and 
anniversaries of events from World War II and the 1991–1995 war, they have 
not generally instigated debates about them. However, in April 2012 the Croa-
tian Parliament decided by a majority of votes to abolish its sponsorship of 
the commemoration at Bleiburg field because of, as it was explained by the 
president of the Parliament, the persistent display of Ustashe iconography and 
other manipulations regarding the NDH25. Since then, this decision has been 
strongly criticized by HDZ and other right-wing parties; the new president of 
the Republic, who was elected as a candidate of right wing parties, soon after 
her inauguration accepted the sponsorship of this year’s Bleiburg commemo-
ration. In past two years, there were some half-hearted attempts to establish 
an alternative place of commemoration for the victims of Partisan crimes (the 
largest mass grave site in Tezno, Slovenia), but the governing coalition even-
tually gave up on that idea. However, the mythology and symbolism around 
Bleiburg is so strong that it is questionable whether it would be at all possible 
to establish another lieu de memoire. 
In the last three years, the Ministry of Education has not intervened too 
much in history curricula and textbooks. This does not mean, however, that 
most important military operations of the Croatian army, to “name distinguished Croatian 
defenders,” and to “precisely define who was the aggressor and who was the victim.” Only 
those crimes in which Croats and Bosnian Muslims were victims are explicitly mentioned 
(Dubrovnik, Vukovar, Srebrenica). On the other hand, the sentence from the original 
curriculum proposal that mentioned the exodus of the Serbian population after Operation 
Storm was removed in the final version. See: Nastavni plan i program za osnovnu školu [The 
National Curriculum for Primary School], Zagreb: Ministarstvo znanosti, obrazovanja 
i športa, 2006, p. 291. These events are nevertheless thematized in most current history 
textbooks, although the manner in which they are presented significantly differs from one 
textbook to another. 
25 See for example: Maja Šurina, “Sabor ukinuo pokroviteljstvo komemoracije u Bleiburgu! 
[Croatian Parliament abolished its sponsorship of the Bleiburg commemoration],” Tportal.
hr, 17. 4. 2012., http://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/188464/Sabor-ukinuo-pokroviteljst-
vo-komemoracije-u-Bleiburgu.html; S. n., “Milanović ide u Tezno umjesto na Bleiburg [Mi-
lanovic is going to Tezno instead of Bleiburg],” Novi list/tportal.hr, 16. 4. 2012., http://www.
tportal.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/188145/Milanovic-ide-u-Tezno-umjesto-na-Bleiburg.html?utm_
source=clanci&utm_medium=manual2&utm_campaign=clanci_manual (accessed April 
19, 2015).
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there were no other ideological confrontations over the content of education, 
rather it was mostly about the curricula of civic and health education. These 
confrontations have been part of a broader culture war between conservative 
forces strongly supported by the Catholic Church and liberal forces, battling 
over issues like same-sex marriage, reproductive rights, or the introduction 
of gender ideology in school curricula. The only major intervention in the 
field of history teaching happened in 2013, when the Ministry of Education 
requested that publishers bring the content of history textbooks adopted in 
2007 up to date, i.e., that they supplement them with new information about 
post-2007 events. Although it was symptomatic that the Ministry had called 
for this “updating” immediately after the ICTY acquitted Croatian generals 
Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markač of charges of war crimes in Operation 
Storm, the whole procedure turned out to be rather uneventful. Similarly, the 
subsequent process of new history textbooks approval in 2014 passed without 
any major debates or demands from the ministry for politically or ideologi-
cally motivated modifications. 
But, with the general elections fast approaching (for the election results, 
see footnote 7), history has once again become a central part of the political 
debate, as well as part of the campaign strategy of HDZ and some other right-
wing parties. The governing left-liberal coalition, too, increasingly accepts the 
heated rhetoric about the topics from the recent past – it has proven as a con-
venient way to draw public attention away from other pressing problems of 
the country. Discussions are focused on topics such as antifascism, Partisan 
crimes in World War II, the activities of the Yugoslav secret services and their 
role in the assassinations of Croatian emigrants, the legacy of the “Homeland 
War,” or the evaluation of historical figures such as Tuđman or Tito. These 
ongoing debates were additionally inflamed by several decisions made by the 
newly elected president of Croatia, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović. In March 2015, 
she decided to remove a relief of Tito from the presidential office. It had been 
exhibited there among the busts of several other important personalities from 
Croatian history during the presidencies of Franjo Tuđman and of his first 
two successors in the office. The decision to remove the relief provoked dis-
cussions about Tito’s role in Croatian history – some condemning him as a 
criminal responsible for the murders of tens of thousands of people and a 
communist dictator of Yugoslavia, others emphasizing his role as one of great 
leaders of the allied struggle against fascism during World War II and of the 
Non-Aligned Movement, praising his resistance to Stalin and for providing 
the peoples of Yugoslavia with a prolonged period of peace, stability, and eco-
nomic growth. 
In April 2015, President Grabarić-Kitarović decided not to take part in 
this year’s commemoration at Jasenovac; at the same time, she announced 
her decision to personally attend the Bleiburg commemoration in May, which 
provoked additional controversy. The president visited the Jasenovac memo-
rial site alone, four days before the official commemoration (the information 
of her visit was released on the web site of the Office of the President only 
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afterwards) and wrote her impressions in the visitor’s book. The text provoked 
criticism because she avoided naming the victims of the concentration camp 
Jasenovac, as well as the regime that was responsible for the atrocities that 
took place there (see footnote 15)26. Faced with criticism about Jasenovac, the 
president gave up on the decision to take part in the Bleiburg commemoration; 
she eventually visited Bleiburg one day before the official commemoration, in 
the same manner in which she visited Jasenovac. In June 2015, however, she 
personally attended the annual celebration of the Anti-Fascist Struggle Day; 
in her speech, the president underlined that antifascism should be preserved 
as a “historical value”, but the “negative heritage of the totalitarian commu-
nist ideology” should be rejected”27. 
But most of all, the new HDZ leadership calls for re-Tuđmanisation – a 
return to the values of the 1990s that stem from the political legacy of Franjo 
Tuđman. During the presidential campaign, the future President of the Re-
public repeatedly invoked the memory of Franjo Tuđman and his political 
heritage. One of her first official photographs taken in the President’s Office 
shows the new president working at former president Tuđman’s desk, thus 
establishing a symbolic connection with the 1990s. In the eve of the general 
elections, however, some leading SDP politicians have also repeatedly praised 
Tuđman’s political merits, including prime minister who said that both Tito 
and Tuđman were the best that Croats had in a given period of history28. How-
ever, proponents of Tuđmanizam take from that legacy only those compo-
nents which they find usable in the present – the creation of the independent 
Croatian state and the victorious “Homeland War” – and omit its negative 
aspects. The new HDZ leadership has even gone one step further: they delib-
erately leave out of Tuđman’s political legacy one of its key ingredients – the 
26 President Grabar-Kitarović wrote in the Book of Impressions: “At this very moment, on 
this day 70 years ago, began the break-out from the Jasenovac camp. I bow to the victims 
and express my deep respect to the people who were tortured and killed in this place. These 
are people who have first and last names, who had their own families and homes, their own 
identity, their own desires and hopes, their own dreams, everything that makes a person 
unique. As President of the Republic of Croatia and as a human being, I unconditionally 
condemn the crimes of torture and killing that happened here. The ideology which caused 
those crimes has been morally and legally condemned. That policy was the will of a regime 
which linked itself with the Nazi-fascist Axis and dishonourably used the Croatian people’s 
legitimate wish for their own state.” The web site of the Office of the President of Croatia, 
http://predsjednik.hr/22_4_ (accessed April 29, 2015).
27 See: “Grabar Kitarović: Antifašizam je povijesna vrijednost, komunizam nije” [Grabar 
Kitarović: Antifascism is a historical value, communism is not], Index.hr, 22. 6. 2015., http://
www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/grabar-kitarovic-antifasizam-je-povijesna-vrijednost-komuni-
zam-nije-/826824.aspx (accessed July 4, 2015).
28  See: Ana Erdelja, „Zoran Milanović: Tito i Tuđman najbolje su što je Hrvatska u tim 
razdobljima povijesti imala“ [Tito and Tuđman were the best that Croatia had in a given period 
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politics of national reconciliation. In his speech at the commemoration of the 
fifteenth anniversary of Tuđman’s death, Karamarko declared Tuđman’s poli-
tics of reconciliation “a failure,” because it was allegedly misused by “those 
who deny Croatia,” those who “never got over the breakup of Yugoslavia”29. 
In the rhetoric of Croatian nationalists, both Yugoslav states are presented 
as essentially anti-Croat, as entities that were created only to secure Serbian 
domination. Because the whole Yugoslav experience – especially its commu-
nist part – is perceived as altogether negative, none of it is accepted as part of 
Croatia’s positive historical heritage, including the Partisan struggle during 
World War II. This interpretation tends to delete any positive memory of the 
Partisan Movement by placing it primarily in the context of the creation of 
Yugoslavia, or by emphasizing only its communist aspects, as well as Parti-
san atrocities committed during the war. It tends to downplay its character 
as a resistance movement and especially its antifascist character. Moreover, 
the events of World War II are now increasingly viewed and judged through 
the prism of the 1991–1995 war: for example, the Yugoslav Army, which was 
responsible for the destruction of Vukovar and the bombing of Dubrovnik 
in 1991, is retroactively linked with the Partisans because they both “wore 
the symbol of the red five-pointed star.” Although this interpretation declara-
tively rejects “all totalitarianisms,” it tends to underplay the fascist character 
of the NDH and often eludes clear value judgments of its crimes30.
All of this, however, serves a very distinctive contemporary purpose: it is 
meant to denounce all those in Croatian society who, allegedly, have never 
wanted an independent Croatia. Such labels are usually attached to the present 
SDP-led government, some other left-wing politicians, some intellectuals and 
non-governmental organizations, or to anyone who interprets the Croatian 
experience during the period of Yugoslavia with any positive connotations. In 
public discourse, a number of derogatory terms are used that recall the hate 
speech of the 1990s: numerous right-wing newspapers and portals, as well 
as some right-wing politicians, label their political opponents as “Yugonos-
talgics,” “Yugophiles,” “Yugoslavs,” “reds,” or “communists.” One right-wing 
portal describes them as “ideological Yugoslavs”; another one defines them as 
“children and grandchildren of those who in 1945 created communist Yugo-
29  See: Dražen Ciglenečki, “Karamarko: Pojam tuđmanizam uvest ćemo u Ustav RH 
[Karamarko: We will introduce the concept of Tuđmanism into the Croatian Constitution],” 
Novi list, 11. 12. 2014., http://www.novilist.hr/Vijesti/Hrvatska/Karamarko-Pojam-
tudmanizam-uvest-cemo-u-Ustav-RH. See also: Speech by Tomislav Karamarko at https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=K4TdLsPMKGU (accessed February 22, 2015).
30  In the last few years, there has been an upsurge in the number of incidents associated 
with the glorification of the NDH (such as chanting the Ustaše slogan Za dom – spremni! 
‘For Home – Ready!’ at sports events and concerts, the celebration of April 10, the date when 
the NDH was established in 1941, the displaying of Ustaše symbols, etc.). As a rule, these 
incidents are not welcomed, but they are also never clearly condemned by many right-wing 
politicians, and increasingly tolerated by some left-wing politicians. 
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slavia with gun in hand or later carried out repression against Croats”31. In the 
present political context, otherwise absurd accusations of “Yugonostalgia” or 
communism sound ominous: they could be understood and interpreted as a 
call to settle scores with alleged enemies. 
Blaming the current government for belittling the “values of the Home-
land War” is another pre-election strategy of HDZ and some other opposition 
parties. There are other groups in the society who make the same claim, the 
most prominent among them being some of the many war veterans’ associa-
tions, as well as certain factions within the Catholic Church. These accusa-
tions are usually justified by means of vague claims that the current govern-
ment “equates the victim and the aggressor,” or “presents the Croats as equally 
guilty for the war as the Serbs.” For example, the government’s efforts to pass 
a law that would regulate the rights of civilian victims of the war regardless of 
their ethnicity, or its attempts to normalize relations with neighboring coun-
tries in the region, are usually described in this manner. In March 2015, a pub-
lic debate was stirred up when the President of the Zagreb County Court, a 
possible candidate for judiciary minister in the prospective HDZ government, 
suggested that Croatia’s new criminal code should penalize those who deny 
the defensive and liberating character of the 1991–1995 war or describe it as a 
civil war32. The judge said that the legal system should “respect and protect the 
values of the Homeland War.” This idea received public support among some 
war veterans’ organizations, politicians, and even some historians. But there 
are those who oppose the idea and see it as an attempt to limit free speech, and 
even as the continuation of a trend to limit political freedoms. The current ju-
diciary minister rejected the proposal, declaring that during his term in office 
nothing resembling verbal assault would be introduced into the penal code33. 
Others oppose the idea of regulating historical interpretations with legal doc-
uments, believing that such provisions would call into question the freedom 
of scientific research. For them, the 1991–1995 war could be interpreted as 
both a civil and an international war34. However, in documents such as the 
31  See for example: Darko Hudelist, “Karamarko: Moj antikomunistički manifest [Karamarko: My 
anti-Communist manifesto]” (an interview with Tomislav Karamarko), Globus, br. 1276, 22. 5. 2015; 
Velimir Bujanec, “1991. protiv Jugoslavije – 2014. protiv Jugoslavena! [In 1991 against Yugoslavia, in 
2014 against Yugoslavs!],” Direktno.hr, 24. 11. 2014., http://direktno.hr/en/2014/kolumne/3608/1991-
Protiv-Jugoslavije---2014-protiv-Jugoslavena!.htm (accessed February 22, 2015).
32  The existing Penal Code already sanctions denial of genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and crimes of aggression (Article 325), provided that such denial is aimed at 
fostering national, ethnic, racial, religious etc. hatred. Narodne novine: službeni list Republike 
Hrvatske (http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/), 125/11, 144/12. 
33 S. N., “Miljenic says threats to lawyer to be prosecuted ex officio,” Dalje.com, 25. 3. 
2015, http://dalje.com/en-croatia/miljenic-says-threats-to-lawyers-to-be-prosecuted-ex-
officio/540236 (accessed 14.4.2015.)
34 Sven Miklenic, “Croatian Law Should Penalise Attacks on War, Judge Says,” Balkan 
Transitional Justice, 20. 3. 2015, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/croatian-judge-
advocates-legal-definition-of-1990s-war (accessed April 14, 2015)
29Dossier
twentieh-century wars in history teaching and public memory 
Croatian Constitution, or parliamentary declarations on the Homeland War 
and Operation Storm, the 1991–1995 war is already defined as a value and as 
one of the foundations of the Croatian state. All these documents emphasize 
the conviction that the war was essentially a defensive war against aggression, 
without the characteristics of a civil war.
There are several other events that recently caused increased tension in 
Croatian society. In autumn 2012, the government decided to put up bilin-
gual inscriptions in the town of Vukovar, written in both Latin and Cyrillic 
scripts. Under the minority rights law, the implementation of this decision 
became mandatory after the 2011 Croatian census, according to which Serbs 
in Vukovar make up more than one-third (34.8%) of Vukovar’s total popula-
tion. This decision became subject to the criticism of a group of Croatian war 
veterans and some other citizens (the so-called Headquarters for the Defense 
of Croatian Vukovar), who believe that, due to the atrocious events that oc-
curred there during the war, Vukovar should be excluded from the appli-
cation of the law. Supported by some right-wing parliamentary parties and 
some individuals, the group organized protest rallies immediately after the 
installment of the signs. In 2013, they even prevented (and in 2014 attempted 
to prevent) the State delegation, which included the Croatian president and 
prime minister, from participating in the annual commemoration of the fall 
of Vukovar (November 18). 
In October 2014, another group of war veterans (among them, many dis-
abled veterans) began a protest in Zagreb. Since then, they have been camped 
out in a large tent in front of the building of the Ministry of War Veterans. 
Besides general requests for improved benefits and legislative protection of 
veterans’ rights, the group has had politically motivated demands from the 
very beginning, such as the resignation of the Minister of Veterans Affairs 
because he has allegedly failed to protect the rights of veterans. During the 
presidential elections, the group publicly endorsed the candidate of HDZ. The 
political motives behind their protest can also be seen in the slogan which for 
months has been displayed in front of the tent: “In 1991 against Yugoslavia, in 
2014 against Yugoslavs!” Over the past months, the group blocked the street 
in front of the Ministry’s building on several occasions, and in May 2015 it 
clashed violently with police in front of the Parliament building. It seems, 
however, that this radicalization of the political scene has changed the mood 
of part of the electorate. Latest surveys have shown that HDZ has retained its 
support among voters at about 30 percent, but also that SDP and the govern-
ing coalition are once again gaining in popularity – apparently, among part 
of the population the left-liberal government is perceived as a bulwark against 
the rise of the radical right. 
In these circumstances, teaching twentieth-century history in general, 
and the 1991–1995 war in particular, becomes another potentially explosive 
issue for the current government. This question has also become relevant be-
cause the Ministry of Education has initiated the reform of education and an-
nounced plans to start work on new subject curricula in the autumn. It is not 
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that the current Ministry of Education has deviated from the course which 
has been hitherto outlined for the teaching of the 1991–1995 war. So far, it has 
not intervened in the existing history curricula. It continues to support the 
annual seminars on the Homeland War. Together with the Ministry of War 
Veterans, the Ministry of Education plans to establish two-day obligatory vis-
its to Vukovar for eighth-grade pupils in elementary school (14 years). During 
these field trips, pupils will be taught in situ about the 1991–1995 war and the 
Battle of Vukovar.35 Furthermore, in 2014 the ministry approved new history 
textbooks whose narratives of the 1991–1995 war very much resemble those 
from 2007 adopted at the time of the HDZ government. 
But this is precisely what has now become a problem. Time and again, crit-
ics insist that existing curricula and textbooks do not pay enough attention 
to the teaching of the 1991–1995 war. (At the moment, this topic is usually 
taught for between three and five class hours, and textbooks usually dedicate 
between 20 and 30 pages for the period of Croatian history after the end of 
1980s.) On several occasions, the HDZ Committee on Education expressed 
their dissatisfaction with the manner in which the war is presented in text-
books. In March 2014, the committee requested the introduction of patrio-
tism as a special topic in the curricula, as well as the teaching of the 1991–1995 
war as part of that topic36. The president of the committee (who is a historian 
himself) has repeatedly criticized (in August 2014 and in March 2015) new 
history textbooks because 
Only one among them explicitly mentions the term “Great-Serbian aggres-
sion” in the context of the causes of the Homeland War. The other three text-
books do not mention the term “Great-Serbian aggression” at all. If history 
textbooks are written by historians, how is it possible that historians cannot 
reach an agreement on well-known facts? How is it possible that the ministry 
permitted the use of these textbooks in schools37?
35 Marina Jurković, “Ministar Mornar: Djeca nam više znaju o Ramzesu II., nego o Oluji 
[Minister Mornar: Children know more about Ramses II, than of Operation Storm],” 
Slobodna Dalmacija, 30. 3. 2015, http://www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/Hrvatska/tabid/66/
articleType/ArticleView/articleId/280300/Default.aspx (accessed April 17, 2015).
36 Ivica Kristović, “Svađa oko povijesti. HDZ odgovara ministru: ‘Jovanović – dostavljač 
udžbenika’ [Quarrel about history. HDZ responds to the Minister: ‘Jovanović – a deliverer 
of textbooks], Večernji list, 25. 3. 2014, http://www.vecernji.hr/hrvatska/hdz-odgovara-
ministru-jovanovic-dostavljac-udzbenika-928987 (accessed February 22, 2015).
37  Maja Šurina, „HDZ bi mijenjao knjige: Tito je out, a Domovinski rat je in [HDZ 
would change textbooks: Tito is out, and the Homeland War is in],” Tportal, 29. 8. 2014., 
http://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/348337/HDZ-bi-mijenjao-knjige-Tito-je-out-a-
Domovinski-rat-je-in.html (accessed February 22, 2015). See also: Mirela Lilek, “HDZ: 
Učenici moraju naučiti kako je počeo rat u Hrvatskoj. Jakovina: To nema veze s modernom 
školom [HDZ: Students need to learn how the war in Croatia began. Jakovina: It has 
nothing to do with the modern school],” Jutarnji list, 9. 4. 2015, http://www.jutarnji.hr/
hdz--ucenici-moraju-nauciti-kako-je-poceo-rat-u-hrvatskoj--jakovina--to-nema-veze-
s-modernom-skolom/1327677/ (accessed February 22, 2015).
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However, it is not that the current history textbooks do not explain the 
causes of the 1991–1995 war. It is also not the case that they do not mention 
aggression against Croatia. What is actually said in the above quotation is 
that some of them do not explain the causes in the “proper” manner – that 
they do not use mandatory terminology and that, to a certain extent, they de-
ter from the official interpretation of the war (for example, by mentioning mi-
stakes committed by Croats as well). Precisely the attempt to present the war 
and its causes in a more complex manner was the main point of controversy 
in 2007; in the present atmosphere, it has become increasingly unpopular to 
question certain given “truths,” not only in history textbooks, but in public 
discourse in general.38 Such attempts are increasingly stigmatized as efforts 
to tarnish or diminish Croatia’s military victory or simply as “equating the 
victim with the aggressor.” The verdicts of acquittal for some Croatian gene-
rals of all charges of war crimes committed in Operation Storm39 have fur-
ther strengthened the general reluctance to confront the crimes committed 
by Croats during the war. 
The current minister of education has obviously decided to counter these 
attacks by adopting the arguments and the tactics of the critics. He has joined 
the chorus of criticism over the way in which the 1991–1995 war is presently 
taught. He has been asking for an increase in the number of class hours dedi-
cated to the topic in the future history curriculum. In February 2015, in his 
opening speech at the Eighth Annual Seminar on the Homeland War for his-
tory teachers, the minister announced that, in the reformed curriculum, the 
topic of the Homeland War will get “an honorary place,” as once the Second 
World War (i.e., the NOB) used to be presented in socialist Yugoslavia. The 
teaching of this topic should, according to minister, include “fewer facts and 
more conclusions”40. 
The minister’s address only confirms what was already noticed in analy-
ses of history textbook narratives on the 1991–1995 war: the teaching of the 
38 As the HDZ leader Tomislav Karamarko recently put it: “We are one of the few countries 
in which the winners have failed to write their own history, but it is written by those who 
lost the war.” See speech by T. Karamarko on March 25, 2015, at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=6LxnpTveEeA. See also: Dražen Ciglenečki: “Neprijatelji svi koji misle drugačije. 
Karamarko teško optužio narod: ‘Za generaciju ili dvije, svi će napokon voljeti Hrvatsku’ 
[Enemies are all those who think differently. Karamarko accuses the nation: ‘In a generation 
or two, everyone will finally love Croatia’],” Novi list, 27. 3. 2015., http://www.novilist.hr/
Vijesti/Hrvatska/Karamarko-tesko-optuzio-narod-Za-generaciju-ili-dvije-svi-ce-napokon-
voljeti-Hrvatsku. (accessed March 27, 2015).
39 United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Appeals 
Chamber Acquits and Orders Release of Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markač” (press release), 
16. 12. 2012, http://www.icty.org/sid/11145 (accessed April 17, 2015). 
40 Marina Jurković, “Ministar Mornar: Djeca nam više znaju o Ramzesu II., nego o Oluji 
[Minister Mornar: Children know more about Ramses II, than of Operation Storm],” 
Slobodna Dalmacija, 30. 3. 2015, http://www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/Hrvatska/tabid/66/
articleType/ArticleView/articleId/280300/Default.aspx (accessed April 17, 2015).
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“National Liberation Struggle” in socialist Yugoslavia increasingly becomes 
a model for the teaching of the “Homeland War” in present-day Croatia.41 
Lessons about the war are primarily used as a tool of promoting patriotism 
through strong and emotional language, detailed descriptions of battles and 
military victories, and portraits of war heroes that are offered to students as 
role-models. There is a prescribed terminology and an obligatory interpreta-
tive framework, which makes it increasingly difficult to teach and write about 
the war in a balanced manner. Thus, in the teaching of history, the two wars 
interconnect on the most problematic level: strategies that were once rightly 
rejected for the teaching of World War II are now offered as the best model for 
the teaching of the 1991–1995 war!
Finally, all of this has a familiar undertone: enemies – external or internal, 
real or imagined – have to be invented and reinvented all the time, either to 
consolidate party ranks or to mobilize potential voters. These strategies are 
nothing new and are mostly due to the lack of vision and perspective of politi-
cal elites in addressing pressing social and economic problems of the coun-
try. However, the current radicalization of political discourse is particularly 
troublesome because it occurs at a time of deep crisis and general pessimism. 
The manner in which history is used can only re-open another vicious cir-
cle of recriminations, bitterness, and hatred; it contributes to the continuous 
tearing of the social fabric in an already polarized society. 
Croatia is, of course, not the only country that has been facing issues from the 
past which create tensions and divide the society. As unpleasant as they might 
be, these debates could in principle help us deal with and confront these issues. 
But persistent attempts to remove causes of tension by eliminating pluralism and 
prescribing mandatory interpretations are increasingly problematic, especially 
when the complex and difficult legacy of the twentieth century is constantly be-
ing reduced to one-dimensional narratives and simplified explanations. 
In this power struggle, the damage for history teaching is constant, even if 
this radical rhetoric will be toned down after the elections. The modest prog-
ress that has been achieved in recent years – especially concerning different 
views about the purpose of school history – is constantly in danger of being 
annulled. It is continuously used as a means in the political game and at the 
same time it is suffering collateral damage. Judging from previous experienc-
es, the future might be bleak: in years to come, we will continue to teach only 
the “right kind of history”.
41  See for example: Koren, Baranović, “What Kind of History Education Do We Have after 
Eighteen Years of Democracy in Croatia?”, 129.
